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“Does It Pay to Be Informed?”
Expenditure Efficiency in the US Mutual Fund Industry
Jan Cerny
Introduction
The mutual fund industry would like us to believe that fund expenses 
are justifiable by their extensive management expertise, security analysis and the 
consequent delivery of returns that exceed the market performance. Management 
know-how is costly and thus it drives up the expenditure of actively managed 
mutual funds and potentially lowers their net returns.  Nevertheless the fund 
managers argue that their contributions to the returns fully outweigh their costs 
and in general their trading strategies add value to the investors. On the other 
hand many academics hold that such claims are fundamentally misleading and 
actively managed funds cannot continuously outperform a market index (See: 
Carhart 1997, Jensen 1968, Malkiel 2003, Sharpe 1964). 
This study aims to provide additional insight into the debate by examining 
the performance of US equity mutual funds over the period of 2002 – 2010. I 
carry out empirical analysis to evaluate relative performance of the funds and 
test whether managers can justify their expenses and fees by higher risk adjusted 
returns. This provides valuable implications about the validity of the Efficient 
Market Hypothesis (EMH) as developed by Sharpe (1964) and is beneficial to the 
broad public that engages in various fund-picking strategies. 
The preponderance of studies regarding mutual fund performance 
indicates that the topic is of crucial importance to the academics, practitioners and 
general public. Unlike most of the previous works, I do not focus on individual 
characteristics of funds that could be used for prediction of future returns. Instead, 
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I examine the performance of the mutual fund market as a whole and test the 
efficiency of resource expenditure across the industry over a period that is yet to 
be fully covered by the researchers. I explore the concept of costly information in 
financial markets and hypothesize that the market is in informational equilibrium 
where resources are spent efficiently. 
For fund expenditure to be “efficient”, it must satisfy the equilibrium 
condition that the marginal cost equals marginal benefit. Return maximization is 
the proclaimed primary goal of mutual funds and so the funds should generate new 
expenses only if such expenses are offset by resulting higher returns. Thus, in theory, 
any extra research and trading may take place only if they add value to the fund. If 
such activities that are inevitably costly do not add enough value to outweigh their 
cost, the industry does not spend their resources efficiently. Such finding would 
suggest investors should focus on funds that minimize their expenditure to the point 
where the marginal cost of their activities equal their marginal benefit. 
In addition to examining the EMH, analyzing performance of the 
funds and efficiency of their expenditure, this study provides insight into the 
controversial assumption of perfect investor rationality. Theoretically, assuming 
perfect information and rational consumers, investors would not pay high fees 
to mutual fund managers unless the managers could deliver (or create credible 
expectation of) returns that would exceed the management costs. In other words, 
if active trading did not add value, rational consumers would adjust in a long run 
and seek alternative investment strategies which would diminish the demand for 
actively trading funds.  
In the first section of this paper, I review past literature and examine its 
contributions and shortcomings. In the second section I discuss the theoretical 
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background of informational equilibrium and resource expenditure efficiency. 
Next I introduce the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) and develop its 
extended version that I employ in my panel data analysis. Subsequently I discuss 
my data in the third section and present the empirical evidence in the fourth 
section. Lastly, I point out the limitations of my work and draw conclusions 
regarding my hypotheses. 
Literature Review
The ability of mutual fund managers to earn excess risk-adjusted returns1 
has been of great interest to researchers for years. Prior to the 1990s the general 
consensus of academics was that investors are not able to earn such returns and 
no fund characteristics could substantially aid them in predicting which managers 
will become the next winners or losers. Nonetheless, numerous studies after 
1990 arrived at opposite conclusions, claiming that returns on mutual funds 
and underlying securities are predictable to a certain degree. These researchers 
concluded that some types of analysis and trading activity allow for superb returns, 
which supports the case of “skilled managers” (Malkiel 1995). The literature on 
the performance of asset management strategies and mutual funds that is relevant 
to this study can be divided into three general categories:
1.) Testing the efficient market hypothesis (EMH). 
 Eugene Fama gave birth to the EMH in the 1960s claiming that, under the 
semi-strong version of the hypothesis, security prices instantly reflect all 
available public information. Consequently there is no information that the 
traders could employ to outsmart or time the market. Thus any charting or 
fundamental analysis will fail to generate substantial risk-adjusted excess 
1 Returns in excess of the risk free rate on Treasury Bills are generally referred to as “excess 
returns” 
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returns. The weak form of the EMH holds that there are no patterns in stock 
prices and so the active management is likely going to significantly increase 
expenses while only marginally contributing to returns.  Therefore, no one 
is able to systematically benefit from the inefficiencies of the market and no 
research or expertise can enhance the fund returns over several years. 
  Ever since its creation, EMH has been tested by hundreds of empirical 
studies that aimed to determine the extent to which markets are efficient. 
The early tests focused on charting and technical analysis, that are often 
associated with active trading, and found most such techniques utterly 
worthless in predicting future price movements (Karz 2010). However, the 
professionals practicing these arguably futile methods have not been driven 
out of the market and so, under the assumption of consumer rationality, their 
service must be considered valuable. In reality most financial institutions 
continue to spend billions to support their technical analysis departments. 
  Academics have also identified several anomalies and patterns that would 
allow active traders to capture substantial risk-adjusted excess returns, such as the 
“size effect” or the “January effect”. Nevertheless, many studies concluded that 
once such patterns are documented and made public, the investors exploit these 
new opportunities to the extent that the patterns disappear or become unprofitable. 
The academic research also points out the paradox of EMH. This paradox states 
that, if all investors believed that markets were efficient, no one would spend 
resources on thorough asset analysis, and so the market would effectively become 
inefficient. Thus, the fund managers who do not believe in market efficiency 
and carry out asset research in pursuit of outperforming the benchmarks play a 
crucial role in actually making the market efficient. Overall, academic research 
and back-testing provided a relatively strong support for the validity of EMH 
across different periods and diverse markets. Therefore, high expenses generated 
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by active management research are not likely to be sufficiently offset by their 
higher returns.
2.) Existence of manager stock picking or market timing skills. 
 Many researchers designed empirical studies to test the existence of skill or 
talent of portfolio managers that would enable the funds to pick the winning 
stock or to properly time their market entry and exit points. Generally, the 
scholarly literature refutes the concept of superior stock picking skills as 
a determinant of fund returns (See the renowned study by Carhart 1997 
or Henriksson 1984). Nonetheless, a limited number of studies argue that 
some managers do possess exceptional skills that allow them to exceed the 
market returns with some level of persistence (See: Gray and Kern 2010). 
Hendricks and Zeckhauser (1991), for example, examined the period of 
1975-88 and found that extensive research and active management strategy 
of mutual funds could yield an excess return of 3% to 4% every year net of 
expenses. If such skills did exist my analysis should indicate that at least 
some funds were able to significantly outperform the market after expenses. 
3.) Persistence in mutual fund performance. 
 A large body of literature focuses on the persistence in mutual fund 
performance claiming that, if there were outstanding actively trading mutual 
fund managers, it would be likely that their excess returns would display 
some level of continuity. Said differently, good players would be expected 
to win more often than others. Nonetheless, past research does not support 
the existence of long term persistence in mutual fund returns and the higher 
the expenses the shorter the persistence in positive returns usually is. For 
example Carhart (1997) documented that, even though some evidence for 
short term persistence of returns can be found, future performance of mutual 
funds is almost impossible to predict. 
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In addition to this wealth of academic literature, thousands of investment 
practitioner articles discuss approaches that should allow investors to select the 
best mutual funds based on their history or characteristics. This literature often 
holds turnover and expense ratios to be substantial determinants of fund returns. 
Some suggest that low turnover (buy-and-hold strategy) and low expenses are 
desirable while others believe that high turnover (active trading) may be an 
indicator of sound strategy and that higher transaction costs of frequent trading 
are fully offset by increased returns. This segment of the literature fails to reach 
a consensus regarding the role of expenses in determination of returns and often 
suffers from severe methodological problems such as omission of survivorship 
bias, which leads to false sense of return predictability (Peterson et al. 2002) 
Methodology
 This study builds on the theories developed by Grossman and Stiglitz 
(1980) and Ippolito (1989) who introduce the concept of costly information into 
the debate over the validity of EMH. Grossman and Stiglitz assert that EMH can-
not hold since prices cannot reflect all available information, because if they did, 
traders who spent resources on obtaining such information would not receive any 
compensation (1980). I apply this framework on the equity mutual fund market 
and focus on the role of expenditure that is associated with the acquisition of in-
formation.  Most of the “active trading” strategies rely on the premise of special 
skill or information of the managers. These strategies are bound to be very costly 
as they are characterized by notably high turnover, which increases transaction 
costs, and higher management fees, resulting from employment of larger amounts 
of human capital (Sharpe 1991, Carhart 1997). It follows, that for these strategies 
to be successful, their benefit needs to outweigh their cost. Conversely, passive 
management strategies such as indexing could be classified as a buy-and-hold 
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strategy with a predictably low portfolio turnover and low expenses. Thus observ-
ing a negative relationship between expenses (indicating information acquisition) 
and the excess returns would suggest that active management at its high levels 
does not add value to investors and passive investment strategies should be pur-
sued.
 Recognizing the existence of these dissimilar management styles, I make 
the simplification that the market can be divided into two types of traders: the 
“informed” and the “uninformed” ones. The “informed” managers believe in 
existence of some information or skill that can increase their performance even 
net of expenses. On the other hand, the “uninformed” managers believe that there 
is no such information that would be worth looking for. Said differently, these 
traders hold that active management with its extensive research creates more 
expenses than it can offset by potentially higher returns. Thus the “uninformed” 
traders generally follow a market index and focus on minimizing their expenses. 
In this work I utilize the information equilibrium theory to address the 
claims of both types of traders. It is clear that acquisition of information and skills 
requires expenditure of time and other resources. Thus one would not engage 
in activity such as market research without expectations of appropriate rewards. 
Rational agents are on average able to learn from their experience. Therefore if 
the agents did not receive any rewards for their expenditure, they would no longer 
pursue the path that proved fruitless. Given these assumptions, in equilibrium, the 
marginal return to additional research or information will equal its marginal cost. 
In such equilibrium, all incentives to get more or less informed diminish.
Applying this framework to the EMH, it seems plausible that managers 
are able to outperform the market before expenses. Nevertheless, the risk-
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adjusted excess returns disappear after the as the expenses are subtracted from 
the higher returns. If the managers that focus on costly research and trading 
were able to outperform the market net of expenses on continuous basis the 
relationship between their expenses and returns would be positive. Conversely, 
if the traditional form of EMH holds, trading on special skill or information is 
essentially a losing game as such practice can only increase expenses without 
enhancing the returns, which reflects a negative relationship between expenses 
and fund performance. Lastly, if the market is in informational equilibrium, there 
will be no relationship between expenses and returns net of fees as any excess 
returns created by extensive research will be exactly offset by higher cost. 
In this work I test this relationship over a broad sample of 500 mutual 
funds. First, I employ the renowned Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) as 
developed by Sharpe (1964) to analyze the actual performance of the funds. I 
estimate the following time series regression model for each fund in the dataset:
(1) R
jt
 – Rft = α + β (Rmt – Rft) + µ
Where R
jt 
is a return on a mutual fund net of fees in period t, Rft is a 
risk free interest rate at year t and Rmt is a return on a broad market portfolio 
such as the S&P 500. This model is widely accepted in the financial industry and 
allows me evaluate the relative risk-adjusted performance of the mutual funds. 
According to Sharpe (1964), the return on a security or a fund less the risk free 
rate is directly proportionate to the amount of risk that the fund takes on. This 
relies on the observation that investors need to be rewarded for taking on extra 
risk. Such reward is known as the CAPM risk premium. Thus risk, measured 
by the coefficient β, is the major determinant of returns. In general, β represents 
the sensitivity of expected excess returns on a fund or an asset j to the expected 
market returns, which is expressed by the following relationship:
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The unexplained portion of the regression, reflected in the intercept α, 
is then attributed to management skill and expertise. Positive alphas indicate that 
a fund was able to outperform the market on risk adjusted basis. Nevertheless, 
the EMH clearly suggests that the expected value of alpha is zero because, on 
average, funds cannot outperform the market as there is no information or practice 
that would enable them to continuously do so. 
If active management and research do not add value, funds engaging in 
such practices will systematically underperform the index funds and will likely 
display significantly negative alphas as a result of high expenditures.  However, 
in informational equilibrium, both actively managed and index funds will perform 
comparably, resulting in alphas that are mostly indistinguishable from zero. 
Furthermore, the average coefficient of β across the funds should be equal to unity 
as a random broad sample of widely diversified funds should in essence mimic the 
market, possessing on average as much risk as the market itself. 
Thus I hypothesize the following:
H1: E(α) = 0  
H2: E(β) = 1
In the second part of the paper I use the respective alpha and beta 
estimates from (1) to examine the role of expenses and turnover in determination 
of fund returns. Inspired by Jensen and Ippolito, I expand the CAPM model by 
including the turnover and expense ratios of funds as well as the variable BMktRF 
(=β
j
*(Rmt – Rft) ), which is a multiple of estimated beta of a fund and the market 
return in excess of the risk free rate2. I construct a pooled dataset of the sample and 
estimate the following OLS panel regression model:
(2) R
jt
 – Rft = b βj*(Rmt – Rft) +  τ turnoverjt + e expensejt + yYear + f Fund + µ
2  For detailed discussion, see the data section. 
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Where Year and Fund are dummy variables unique to each fund and 
time period. These variables address the problem of correlation of the residuals. 
The coefficient β
j 
estimated in regression (1), becomes a part of an explanatory 
variable3. The way β
j 
is estimated in (1) results in the fact that the coefficient b on 
the variable β
j
*(Rmt – Rft) should be statistically insignificant in difference from 
unity and so this coefficient is not key for the inference about my hypotheses. 
On the other hand the variables turnover and expenses play an essential 
role as they can explain some of the fund performance that was previously captured 
by alphas. I hypothesize that funds generally spend their resources efficiently. 
Therefore the coefficient on expenses should be statistically insignificant in 
difference from zero, supporting the irrelevance of expenses hypothesis. A 
positive coefficient would suggest that managers are not only able to offset the 
higher expenses created by research and trading, but that the extra returns of such 
strategy outweigh the extra costs. 
Thus, unlike most studies that simply assume a negative relationship 
between expenses and returns net of expenses, I test the relationship and 
hypothesize a neutral impact of expenses on returns:
H3: e = 0 
Lastly, to understand the connection between equations (1) and (2), 
one should take into account that the first model simply states that returns 
are determined by the movement of the market and an unexplained cluster of 
management skill and information. The second regression is then used to analyze 
this cluster and examine whether some of this unexplained portion of returns is 
attributable to expenses or fund turnover. 
3  Usage of an estimated coefficient as a part of an explanatory variable inevitably injects extra 
variation in the regression.
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Data
 In my research if would be optimal to work with monthly Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) data that are used in most of the academic 
studies.  However, my data selection is restricted by the research budget as the 
financial data of the mutual fund industry are generally very costly. I limited the 
range of my data to eight annual observations in years 2002-2010 for a universe of 
small-cap growth, large-cap growth, small-cap value and large-cap value equity 
mutual funds, as supplied by Lipper – the Thompson Reuters Company. Ideally 
all observation would be included for all time periods to make my panel data 
balanced. Nevertheless, as I point out in the limitations section, this is not the case 
and my dataset misses about 7% of its observations.  
 To construct a sample from this universe of 2191 funds I randomly select 
500 mutual funds and categorize them according to their asset classes. The basic 
version of my dataset includes:  fund returns net of expenses, turnover and expense 
ratios. Furthermore I add the excess return on the market (Rmt– Rft) denoted as 
MktRf. This variable was obtained from online “French and Fama Library” and is 
constructed as follows (Kenneth R. French - Data Library):
 The excess return on the market is computed by subtracting the Treasury 
bill rate (obtained from Ibbotson Associates) from the value-weighted return on 
all stocks traded in the United States (obtained from CRSP). This variable is likely 
to move closely with the excess returns of any particular mutual fund and so I 
expect it to hold a significant explanatory power.
 Furthermore, to answer my research question I construct the dependent 
variable for excess returns of the funds (exreturn) by subtracting the risk free 
interest rate on ten-year Treasury bills from the percentage return on the fund net 
65
of fees. This provides me with a measure of returns in excess of the risk free rate 
that the fund was able to capture. 
 Lastly, it appears that the random sample is fairly representative of the 
market during the period. The distribution of the sample funds across categories is 
depicted in Table 1, and Table 2 summarizes my data. For detailed data summary 
see Appendix 1.
 Table 2 correctly points out that my panel is not balanced as the variables 
exreturn, turnover and expense are missing 299, 342 and 387 observations 
respectively. Although some observations are absent, the dataset does not suffer 
from substantial survivorship bias4 as the vast majority of the sample funds survived 
throughout the examined period. In fact the mean number of periods observed per 
fund is 7.402 with minimum of 3 and maximum of 8 periods available per funds. 
Most of the unobserved periods seem to be a result of the simple fact that the fund 
were not yet in existence in the earlier years of the examined period. I further 
4 Survivorship Bias refers to a tendency to omit failed mutual funds from performance evaluation. 
If only funds that were successful enough to survive were included in the sample, the perfor-
mance results could be skewed upwards as the sample would not reflect the inferior returns of 
funds that have gone out of business. 
14	  
(obtained	  from	  Ibbotson	  Associates)	  from	  the	  value-­‐weighted	  return	  on	  all	  stocks	  traded	  in	  the	  
United	  States	  (obtained	  from	  CRSP).	  This	  variable	  is	  likely	  to	  move	  closely	  with	  the	  excess	  
returns	  of	  any	  particular	  mutual	  fund	  and	  so	  I	  expect	  it	  to	  hold	  a	  significant	  explanatory	  power.	  
	   Furthermore,	  to	  answer	  my	  research	  question	  I	  construct	  the	  dependent	  variable	  for	  
excess	  returns	  of	  the	  funds	  (exreturn)	  by	  subtracting	  the	  risk	  free	  interest	  rate	  on	  ten-­‐year	  
Treasury	  bills	  from	  the	  percentage	  return	  on	  the	  fund	  net	  of	  fees.	  This	  provides	  me	  with	  a	  
measure	  of	  returns	  in	  excess	  of	  the	  risk	  free	  rate	  that	  the	  fund	  was	  able	  to	  capture.	  	  
	   Lastly,	  it	  appears	  that	  the	  random	  sa ple	  is	  fai ly	  repres ntative	  of	  the	  market	  during	  the	  
period.	  The	  distribution	  of	  the	  sample	  funds	  across	  categories	  is	  depicted	  in	  Table	  1,	  and	  Table	  
2	  summarizes	  my	  data.	  For	  detailed	  data	  summary	  see	  Appendix	  1.	  
	  
Table	  1	  
Category	  Frequency	  in	  Percentages	  
	  
Growth	   Value	  
Large	  Cap	   41%	   21%	  
Small	  Cap	   25%	   12%	  
	  
	   	  
15	  
Table	  2	  
Summary	  of	  Data	  
Variable	   #	  Observations	   Mean	   St.	  dev	   Minimum	   Maximum	  
Exreturn	   3701	   3.44	   25.9	   -­‐60.40	   164.26	  
MktRf	   4000	   3.93	   23.18	   -­‐39.94	   32.12	  
Turnover	   3658	   90.82	   97.99	   1	   1359	  
Expense	   3613	   1.46	   .64	   .07	   12.42	  
	  
	   Table	  2	  correctly	  points	  out	  that	  my	  panel	  is	  not	  balanced	  as	  the	  variables	  exreturn,	  
turnover	  and	  expense	  are	  missing	  299,	  342	  and	  387	  observations	  respectively.	  Although	  some	  
observations	  are	  absent,	  the	  dataset	  does	  not	  suffer	  from	  substantial	  survivorship	  bias4	  as	  the	  
vast	  majority	  of	  the	  sample	  funds	  survived	  throughout	  the	  examined	  period.	  In	  fact	  the	  mean	  
number	  of	  periods	  observed	  per	  fund	  is	  7.402	  with	  minimum	  of	  3	  and	  maximum	  of	  8	  periods	  
available	  per	  funds.	  Most	  of	  the	  unobserved	  periods	  seem	  to	  be	  a	  result	  of	  the	  simple	  fact	  that	  
the	  fund	  were	  not	  yet	  in	  existence	  in	  the	  earlier	  years	  of	  the	  examined	  period.	  I	  further	  examine	  
this	  potential	  problem	  of	  “creation	  bias”	  in	  the	  limitations	  section	  of	  this	  work.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  Survivorship	  Bias	  refers	  to	  a	  tendency	  to	  omit	  failed	  mutual	  funds	  from	  performance	  evaluation.	  If	  only	  funds	  that	  
were	  successful	  enough	  to	  survive	  were	  included	  in	  the	  sample,	  the	  performance	  results	  could	  be	  skewed	  upwards	  
as	  the	  sample	  would	  not	  reflect	  the	  inferior	  returns	  of	  funds	  that	  have	  gone	  out	  of	  business.	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examine this potential problem of “creation bias” in the limitations section of this 
work.
Additionally, several 
other important observations 
arise from Table 2. The mean 
excess return (3.44%) is 
surprisingly high over a period 
of several economic slumps. 
Average turnover of a fund is 
90.8%, suggesting that an average fund in the sample turned over about 91% of 
its holdings during a year. Turnover rate is calculated by dividing the fund’s total 
sales or purchases (whichever is less) by its average monthly assets. The rate then 
represents the percentage of the fund holdings that change over the course of the 
year. Taking this knowledge into account I notice an outlier in the turnover data: 
1359. It seems unlikely that a fund would turn all its assets over more than 13 
times in a year. In fact, Figure 1 illustrates that only a negligible percentage of the 
turnover observations are greater than 600. Since the large outlier might impact 
coefficient estimation I drop the outliers beyond five standard deviations from the 
mean (turnover of 580). This seems theoretically justifiable as it is improbable 
that even very active funds would turn their assets over more than six times a year 
(Wermers 2002). By omitting the potential outliers I drop 23 observations5, but 
the estimates of the model change only very marginally.
 To account for the unique characteristics of each fund and each year I 
construct dummy variables that also enable me to address the problem of 
correlation between residuals. It is reasonable to assume that the funds are unique 
as different fund managers arguably possess different skills and employ dissimilar 














investment strategies. For the sake of simplicity, I assume that fund managers did 
not change during the examined period or that if a manager left, the fund carried 
on the investment strategy, style and know-how of the original manager. This also 
implies that the targeted level of risk of the fund, reflected by the fund’s Beta, has 
not changed during the period, which is an essential assumption of the CAPM 
analysis. Using the methodology of Ippolito I test this assumption against my data 
by running a regression for each fund with a dummy variable D and its interaction 




 – Rft = α + β (Rmt – Rft) + c D + d (Rmt – Rft)*D + µ
where D is a dummy variable for years 2006-2009. If the coefficient d were 
statistically significant in difference from zero, the assumption of constant beta 
would be highly questionable. I find that 82 funds or about 16% of my sample 
display betas that are not stable at the 95% confidence interval. Exclusion of these 
funds from my analysis however does not change the results substantially. 
Limitations 
 This study faces several key limitations that need to be addressed. First, 
due to the nature of my data, I am unable to separate trading costs and management 
expenses that are both reflected in the total expenses. Such division would enable 
me to make a stronger argument about the impact of management fees on the risk-
adjusted returns. Nonetheless, the correlation6 between expenses and turnover, 
which is directly related to trading costs, is relatively low. Therefore most of the 
expenses seem attributable to management fees. Consequently my results are 
mostly indicative of the role of management expenditure in determination of 
returns.
6  The correlation coefficient is  0.17 
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 Second, my research faces the “black box” problem for I am unable 
to ascertain changes in portfolio holdings or drifts in the beta of the funds. In 
particular, I assume that targeted level of risk (beta) and core investment strategy of 
the fund remained constant during the period. These assumptions are theoretically 
sound as most funds position themselves as pursuing a certain investment style 
and strive to retain this image in the eyes of investors. However, if this were not 
the case, my estimates of the panel data regression would not accurately reflect the 
true relationships between the dependent and explanatory variables.
 Third, my panel dataset is not balanced and suffers from a survivorship 
bias. In fact, because of the constrained data selection process I can examine only 
those funds that were still operating in 2011. Thus no funds in my dataset cease 
their existence during the analyzed period and 114 funds were not yet in business 
at the beginning of 2002. As Figure 2 indicates the number of funds in the market 
declined by approximately 6% over the period 2002-2009, while the number of 
operating funds in my sample actually increased by 28%. This “creation bias” 
may skew my results.  Nevertheless, it seems to have a relatively minor impact 
on my estimates and so it does not substantially threaten the credibility of my 
conclusions. In addition, it is interesting to note that the net asset value (NAV) of 
the mutual fund industry had been increasing at an unprecedented rate until the 
financial crisis in 2008.
 Fourth, this study can be subject to the criticism that the very limited 
number of time series observations used for estimation of alphas and betas may 
cause such estimates to be seriously inaccurate. Although a greater number of 
observations in the regression analysis would certainly be very beneficial, the 
utilized dataset should provide a good general sense of the size of the true 
coefficients. Future research should employ quarterly observations for the given 
period to produce more accurate estimates of the alphas and betas. 
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 Lastly, my analysis faces several econometric problems. Researchers 
have abundantly documented that using pooled data of this kind is likely to result 
in positive correlation among residuals. The often complex correlation between 
the residuals across time and across the industry would have a diminishing impact 
on the size of the standard errors of the estimates and could occur trough two 
avenues: The error terms may be correlated for a group of funds during a given 
year (due to the value and small stock effects etc.) or may be serially correlated for 
a specific fund (high performers may have generally positive residuals) (Ippolito 
1989). I address this issue by including dummy variables for years and funds as 
well as using HAC standard errors.
 
Results
 First, let us focus on the relative performance of funds across the time 
period to understand the patterns in their returns. Table 3 provides an overview 
of the coefficients alpha and beta estimated for each fund using the CAPM model 
(1). As I expected, the mean beta is close to the beta of market which is a unity. 
This finding supports my hypothesis H2 that on average the widely diversified 
funds hold as much risk as the market itself does (H2: E(β) = 1).
 Furthermore, the average alpha of the sample is negative, suggesting 
that the funds on average slightly underperformed the market on risk adjusted 
70
basis. Nonetheless, a more useful approach to evaluate the validity of this claim 
is to test whether the individual alphas of the particular funds are lower than zero. 
The results of this analysis are summarized in Table 4. This table also includes a 
comparison with the results of Ippolito (1989) and Jensen (1964) who employed 
a similar methodology in their prominent studies.
 Table 4 clearly indicates that the vast majority, 97% of the sample, 
neither outperformed nor underperformed the market at a 95% confidence 
interval. This observation supports my hypothesis H1 that on average mutual 
funds neither outperform nor underperform the market after expenses (H1: E(α) 
= 0). It is worth noting that two percent of the sample funds underperformed the 
market significantly while one percent of the funds substantially outperformed the 
benchmarks. These findings are generally in accord with the results of Ippolito 
and Jensen, although their proportions of the samples that displayed alphas 
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Results	  
	   First,	  let	  us	  focus	  on	  the	  relative	  performance	  of	  funds	  across	  the	  time	  period	  to	  
understand	  the	  patterns	  in	  their	  returns.	  Table	  3	  provides	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  coefficients	  alpha	  
and	  beta	  estimated	  for	  each	  fund	  using	  the	  CAPM	  model	  (1).	  As	  I	  expected,	  the	  mean	  beta	  is	  
close	  to	  the	  beta	  of	  market	  which	  is	  a	  unity.	  This	  finding	  supports	  my	  hypothesis	  H2	  that	  on	  
average	  the	  widely	  diversified	  funds	  hold	  as	  much	  risk	  as	  the	  market	  itself	  does	  (H2:	  E(β)	  =	  1).	  
	   Furthermore,	  the	  average	  alpha	  of	  the	  sample	  is	  negative,	  suggesting	  that	  the	  funds	  
on	  average	  slightly	  underperformed	  the	  market	  on	  risk	  adjusted	  basis.	  Nonetheless,	  a	  more	  
useful	  approach	   o	   valuate	  the	  validity	  of	  this	  cl im	  is	  to	  test	  wh ther	  the	  individual	  alphas	  of	  
the	  particular	  funds	  a e	  lower	  than	  zero.	  	  T e	  results	  of	  this	  analysis	  are	  summarized	  in	  Table	  4.	  
This	  table	  also	  includes	  a	  comparison	  with	  the	  results	  of	  Ippolito	  (1989)	  and	  Jensen	  (1964)	  who	  
employed	  a	  similar	  methodology	  in	  their	  prominent	  studies.	  
	  
Table3	  
Overview	  for	  the	  Sample	  
	  	   Obs	   Mean	  	   St.	  Dev.	   Min	  	   Max	  
Alpha	   500	   -­‐0.62	   2.56	   -­‐11.47	   8.51	  
Beta	  	   500	   1.05	   0.18	   0.49	   1.71	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Table4	  
Analysis	  of	  Estimated	  Alphas:*	  
	  





My	  results	  (2002-­‐09)	   485	   10	   5	   500	   -­‐0.62	   1.05	  
Ippolito	  (1965-­‐84)	   127	   4	   12	   143	   0.81	   0.88	  
Jensen	  (1945-­‐1964)	   98	   14	   3	   115	   -­‐1.1	   0.84	  
	   	   	   	  
*calculated	  at	  95%	  confidence	  interval	  	  
	  
Proportions	  of	  Samples:	  
	  
	  
Zero	   Negative	   Positive	  
My	  results	  (2002-­‐09)	   97%	   2%	   1%	  
Ippolito	  (1965-­‐84)	   89%	   3%	   8%	  
Jensen	  (1945-­‐1964)	   85%	   12%	   3%	  
	  
	   Table	  4	  clearly	  indicates	  that	  the	  vast	  majority,	  97%	  of	  the	  sample,	  neither	  
outperformed	  nor	  underperformed	  the	  market	  at	  a	  95%	  confidence	  interval.	  This	  observation	  
supports	  my	  hypothesis	  H1	  that	  on	  average	  mutual	  fund 	  neither	  outperform	  nor	  
erp rform	  the	  market	  after	  expenses	  (H1:	  E(α)	  =	  0).	  It	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  two	  percent	  of	  
the	  sample	  funds	  underperformed	  the	  market	  significantly	  while	  one	  percent	  of	  the	  funds	  
substantially	  outperformed	  the	  benchmarks.	  These	  findings	  are	  generally	  in	  accord	  with	  the	  
results	  of	  Ippolito	  and	  Jensen,	  although	  their	  proportions	  of	  the	  samples	  that	  displayed	  alphas	  
indistinguishable	  from	  zero	  are	  smaller.	  This	  fact	  may	  be	  attributable	  to	  numerous	  factors	  
ranging	  from	  very	  dissimilar	  market	  and	  economic	  conditions	  involving	  financial	  uncertainty	  to	  
shortcomings	  of	  my	  data.	  	  
	   Additionally,	  I	  estimate	  the	  mean	  alphas	  and	  turnover	  ratios	  by	  different	  fund	  
categories	  to	  examine	  potential	  patterns	  in	  the	  industry.	  The	  results	  of	  this	  estimation	  are	  
reported	  in	  table	  5.	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indistinguishable from zero are smaller. This fact may be attributable to numerous 
factors ranging from very dissimilar market and economic conditions involving 
financial uncertainty to shortcomings of my data. 
 Additionally, I estimate the mean alphas and turnover ratios by 
different fund categories to examine potential patterns in the industry. The results 
of this estimation are reported in table 5. 
 The table provides several appealing observations.  The largest 
negative alphas on average were documented in the large cap growth category 
while small cap value category displayed on average the greatest positive alphas. 
Since most of the security research and information is readily available in the 
large cap growth category, it is reasonable to assume that the marginal return on 
research and information is the lowest in the category. This would be especially 
true if mutual fund managers who actually carry out the research would be slower 
to act on certain information than public traders. Conversely, information is 
generally scarce among small cap stocks and particularly in the small cap value 
category. Therefore marginal return to research could be the highest in this stock 
class, enabling mutual fund managers to truly benefit from their security analysis 
and trading expertise. 
 Such hypotheses are generally supported by my findings. The large 
mean alpha in small cap value category indicates that the fund managers in this 
equity class were able to beat the “uninformed” market after expenses. Generally 




Mean	  Estimated	  Alphas	  by	  Categories:	  
	  
Mean	  Turnover	  by	  Categories:	  
	  	   Growth	   Value	  
	  
	  	   Growth	   Value	  
Large	  Cap	   -­‐1.25	   -­‐1.01	  
	  
Large	  Cap	   94.04	   58.26	  
Small	  Cap	   -­‐0.15	   1.27	  
	  
Small	  Cap	   122.23	   71.92	  
	  
	   The	  table	  provides	  several	  appealing	  observations.	  	  The	  largest	  negative	  alphas	  on	  
average	  were	  documented	  in	  the	  large	  cap	  growth	  category	  while	  small	  cap	  value	  category	  
displayed	  on	  average	  the	  greatest	  positive	  alphas.	  	  Since	  most	  of	  the	  security	  research	  and	  
infor ation	  is	  readily	  availabl 	  in	  the	  large	  cap	  g owth	  category,	  it	  is	  reason l 	  to	  assume	  that	  
the	  mar inal	  return	  on	  research	  and	  informati n	  i 	  the	  lowes 	  in	  the	  category.	  This	  w uld	  be	  
especially	  true	  if	   utual	  fund	  managers	  who	  actually	  carry	  out	  the	  research	  would	  be	  slower	  to	  
act	  on	  certain	  information	  than	  public	  traders.	  Conversely,	  information	  is	  generally	  scarce	  
among	  small	  cap	  stocks	  and	  particularly	  in	  the	  small	  cap	  value	  category.	  Therefore	  marginal	  
return	  to	  research	  could	  be	  the	  highest	  in	  this	  stock	  class,	  enabling	  mutual	  fund	  managers	  to	  
truly	  benefit	  from	  their	  security	  analysis	  and	  trading	  expertise.	  	  
	   Such	  hypotheses	  are	  generally	  supported	  by	  my	  findings.	  The	  large	  mean	  alpha	  in	  
small	  cap	  value	  category	  indicates	  that	  the	  fund	  managers	  in	  this	  equity	  class	  were	  able	  to	  beat	  
the	  “uninformed”	  market	  after	  expenses.	  Generally	  one	  can	  notice	  that	  the	  mean	  alphas,	  as	  
indicators	  of	  management	  skill,	  are	  on	  average	  lower	  in	  the	  large	  cap	  segments	  than	  in	  the	  
small	  cap	  categories.	  This	  observation	  might	  be	  partially	  caused	  by	  so	  called	  “size	  effect”	  which	  
states	  that	  small	  cap	  stocks	  generally	  outperform	  large	  cap	  stocks.	  This	  anomaly	  to	  the	  CAPM	  
model	  has	  been	  widely	  documented.	  French	  and	  Fama	  for	  instance	  argue	  that	  on	  average	  
holding	  small	  stock	  enables	  an	  investor	  to	  capture	  greater	  excess	  returns	  than	  holding	  other	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average lower in the large cap segments than in the small cap categories. This 
observation might be partially caused by so called “size effect” which states that 
small cap stocks generally outperform large cap stocks. This anomaly to the CAPM 
model has been widely documented. French and Fama for instance argue that on 
average holding small stock enables an investor to capture greater excess returns 
than holding other asset classes for any given level of risk (1992).  The size effect 
represents a premium that is not associated with management skills. Therefore, 
the alphas of funds focused on small cap stocks may be overstated. To test this 
claim I estimate the CAPM model (1) with SMB as an explanatory variable. The 
variable SMB is constant for every year and reflects by how much the small cap 
market portfolios, constructed by French and Fama, outperformed the large cap 
market portfolios (Kenneth R. French - Data Library). Under such estimation the 
disparity among the alphas largely disappears and the alphas become generally 
more negative, except for the category large cap growth, where the mean alpha 
slightly increases. The results of this estimation are presented in Appendix 3. 
 Turnover correctly reflects the phenomenon that value investors tend to 
wait more and trade less than growth investors. The growth investors believe that 
they can frequently trade on certain information even if it is not fully supported 
by the fundamentals of the stock (Strong 2004). For these reasons the turnover 
of growth funds is generally higher than turnover of value funds. Additionally, I 
would expect the mean turnover on the large cap growth category to be the highest 
because abundant information that one can trade on is available and because most 
day trading strategies focus on this asset class. Nevertheless, this is not the case 
and small cap value segment actually displays the highest mean turnover. This 
seemingly puzzling fact is not extremely surprising as even the most prominent 
researchers fail to reach a consensus regarding the relationship between returns, 
asset classes and fund turnover.
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 Considering these observations about the actual performance of the 
funds over the examined period I further analyze the role that expenses and 
turnover play in determination of these returns. I estimate the panel data regression 
(2) for each of the fund classes large cap growth (LG), large cap value (LV), small 
cap growth (SG) and small cap value (SV) as well as for the entire sample. In the 
estimation for particular fund classes I omit the fund and year dummy variables as 
most of the dummy variables would be dropped due to collinearly. Nevertheless, 
for the overall sample I run regressions both with (Overall 1) and without (Overall 
2) the dummy variables. Additionally, I employ HAC standard errors in all my 
estimations because my sample suffers from severe heteroscedasticity. The results 
are presented in Table 6.
 Several important observations arise from the results. The coefficient 
on BMktRf, which represents the CAPM market premium (Rmt – Rft) multiplied 
by the previously estimated beta of the fund, is not statistically significant in 
difference from one. This is exactly what I expected because beta is originally 
estimated as a coefficient on MktRf. Thus there will likely be a one to one 
relationship between BMktRf and excess returns. 
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growth	  (LG),	  large	  cap	  value	  (LV),	  small	  cap	  growth	  (SG)	  and	  small	  cap	  value	  (SV)	  as	  well	  as	  for	  
the	  entire	  sample.	  In	  the	  estimation	  for	  particular	  fund	  classes	  I	  omit	  the	  fund	  and	  year	  dummy	  
variables	  as	  most	  of	  the	  dummy	  variables	  would	  be	  dropped	  due	  to	  collinearly.	  Nevertheless,	  
for	  the	  overall	  sample	  I	  run	  regressions	  both	  with	  (Overall	  1)	  and	  without	  (Overall	  2)	  the	  
dummy	  variables.	  Additionally,	  I	  employ	  HAC	  standard	  errors	  in	  all	  my	  estimations	  because	  my	  
sample	  suffers	  from	  severe	  heteroscedasticity.	  The	  results	  are	  presented	  in	  Table	  6.	  
	  
Table	  6	  
Estimated	  Coefficients	  by	  Categories:	  
Dependent	  variable:	  Exreturn	  =	  Rjt	  –	  Rft	  
	  
	   	  
	  
	  









































**	  Statistically	  significant	  at	  95%	  confidence	  level	  
*	  Statistically	  significant	  at	  90%	  confidence	  level	  
In	  parenthesis:	  Standard	  Errors	  
	  
Overall	  1:	  Dummy	  variables	  for	  years	  and	  funds	  were	  employed	  
Overall	  2:	  No	  dummy	  variables	  were	  employed	  
	  
	   Several	  important	  observations	  arise	  from	  the	  results.	  The	  coefficient	  on	  BMktRf,	  
which	  represents	  the	  CAPM	  market	  premium	  (Rmt	  –	  Rft)	  multiplied	  by	  the	  previously	  estimated	  
beta	  of	  the	  fund,	  is	  not	  statistically	  significant	  in	  difference	  from	  one.	  This	  is	  exactly	  what	  I	  
expected	  because	  beta	  is	  originally	  estimated	  as	  a	  coefficient	  on	  MktRf.	  Thus	  there	  will	  likely	  be	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 In the regressions for the entire sample, the coefficients on expenses are 
statistically insignificant in difference from zero which supports my hypothesis 
that the impact of expenses is in essence neutral (H3: e = 0). The coefficients 
obtained from the sub-samples of asset classes are in size similar to the coefficient 
on estimation with no dummy variables. Therefore, it appears that the relatively 
high coefficient on expenses in estimation of Overall 1 is purely due to the 
inclusion of dummy variables for years and funds. 
More interestingly, the coefficient e is negative and statistically significant 
in difference from zero in the large cap categories while remaining insignificant in 
the small cap categories. This finding supports the proposed theory that the lack 
of readily available information in the small cap categories increases the marginal 
returns on information and consequently enables managers to offset their research 
and management expenses by resulting higher returns. In contrary, it seems that, 
in the large cap segment, research and active trading that drive expenses are likely 
to lower the net returns of the funds, which supports the EMH. These findings 
are not impacted by the size effect and hold among several model specifications.
Turnover seems to be almost perfectly neutral across the entire sample 
and the sub-categories because the estimated coefficients are indistinguishable 
from zero. This would imply that the amount of trading itself does not have a 
substantial impact on the returns. Additionally, turnover is a proxy for trading 
expenses that are already incorporated in the expense ratios. Therefore, as I have 
noted before, one may expect high correlation between the variables turnover 
and expenses. Nevertheless, the relatively low correlation coefficient of these 
variables (0.17) indicates that most of the expenses are due to research and 
management fees rather than trading expenses. In future, it would be beneficial to 
obtain data for management fees and expenses separately as this would strengthen 
my inference from the empirical results. 
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Conclusion
 Combining the analysis of individual fund and market performance, it 
is clear that most of the funds across different asset classes neither substantially 
outperformed nor underperformed the market on risk-adjusted basis during the 
period 2002-2009. I document that although this was true for a majority of the 
funds, some asset classes yielded greater risk adjusted excess returns than others. 
In fact, the estimation of individual fund’s alphas indicates that funds in the small 
cap categories outperformed those in the large cap segment of the market on risk 
adjusted basis. This could be caused by the fact that small stock tends to generate 
greater returns than other asset classes, for any given level of risk. This so called 
“size effect” is confirmed by my empirical analysis and artificially inflates the 
alphas of managers who focus on small cap stocks. Using the French and Fama 
methodology, I find that the differences in alphas diminish after I account for the 
size effect. This suggests that, abstracting from the size effect, the managers on 
average performed comparatively well in all of the categories. 
 Nevertheless, even after I account for the size effect, the key result 
indicated by my analysis remains unchanged: Contrary to a popular public view, 
there does not seem to be a negative relationship between expenses and returns 
net of fees.  The estimated coefficient on expenses that is indistinguishable from 
zero suggests that the mutual funds on average spend their resources efficiently. 
In other words fund expenses that generally increase due to research and active 
management are at least offset by resulting higher returns. This observation 
holds across all estimations presented in this study and is theoretically justifiable 
assuming existence of costly information in financial markets.  
 However, several interesting exceptions arise from the estimations of 
particular sub-classes. I document a significant negative impact of expenses on 
76
excess returns in the large cap categories, while observing a non-negative effect 
in the small cap categories. This finding remains unaffected even after accounting 
for the size effect, suggesting its relative strength.
 Therefore, I conclude that, although the semi-strong EMH holds in most 
cases, the managers focusing on asset classes with low availability of information 
may experience high returns to information and consequently outperform the 
market before expenses. In addition, my empirical analysis indicates expenditure 
efficiency, suggesting that the overall mutual fund market as well as its small cap 
segment is in a relative informational equilibrium. In such equilibrium the traders 
carry out just enough research that its marginal cost equals marginal benefit of the 
information gained.  
 On the other hand, the large cap class of the mutual fund market does 
not appear to be in such equilibrium. I find that in this category the increased 
expenses negatively contribute to the fund returns. Therefore, in large cap, more 
research and management is unlikely to increase returns. In fact, greater active 
management is likely to be counterproductive and so I hold that the large cap 
funds are not spending their resources efficiently. To bring this market segment 
into equilibrium, rational agents would cut their expenses, decrease the amount of 
research and human capital they employ or would focus on more profitable market 
segments. It seems reasonable to believe that the reasons why this has not been the 
case lie in the problems of imperfect information and bounded rationality. Future 
research should focus on such differences between the two markets segments and 




Carhart, Mark. “On Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance .” The Journal of Finance 52, no. 1 
(1997): 57-82. 
Fama, Eugen , and Kenneth  French. “The Capital Asset Pricing Model: Theory and Evidence.” 
Journal of Economic Perspectives 18, no. 3 (2004): 25-46.
Fama, Eugen, and Kenneth French. “The Cross-Section of Expected Stock Return.” The Journal of 
Finance XLVII, no. 2 (1992): 247-265.
French, Kenneth. “Kenneth R. French - Data Library.” Tuck - MBA program web server. http://mba.
tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html (accessed October 20, 2010).
Gray, Wesley, and Andrew Kern. “Do Hedge Fund Managers Have Stock Picking Skills?.” Social 
Science Research Network. http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1477586 (accessed September 25, 
2010).
Grinblatt, Mark , and Sheridan Titman. “The Persistence of Mutual Fund Performance.” The Journal 
of Finance XLVII, no. 5 (1992): 1977-1984.
Grossman, Sanford J. and Joseph E. Stiglitz. “On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient 
Markets.” American Economic Review. no 3 (1980): 393–408
Hendricks, Darryll, Jayendu Patel, and Richard Zeckhauser, “Hot hands in mutual funds: Short-run 
persistence of performance, 1974-88” Working paper, Harvard University. (1991)
 Henriksson, Roy, D. “Market Timing and Mutual Fund Performance: An Empirical Investigation.” 
Journal of Business, 57 (1984), pp. 73-96.
«Investment Company Institute.» 2010 Factbook. http://www.icifactbook.org (accessed September 
19, 2010).
Jensen 1967, Michael. «The Performance of Mutual Funds in the Period 1945-1964 .» The Journal of 
Finance 23, no. 2 (1967): 389-416.
Karz, Gary. “The Efficient Market Hypothesis.” Investor Home . http://www.investorhome.com/emh.
htm (accessed October 10, 2010).
Lehmann, Bruce, and David Modest. “Mutual Fund Performance Evaluation: A Comparison of 
Benchmarks and Benchmark Comparisons.” Journal of Finance 42 (1987): 233-265.
Malkiel, Burton. “The Efficient Market Hypothesis and Its Critics.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 
17, no. 1 (2003): 59-82. 
Malkiel, Burton. “Returns from Investing in Equity Mutual Funds 1971 to 1991.” The Journal of 
Finance 2 (1995): 549-572.
Peterson, James, Paul Pietanico, Mark Riepe, and Fran Xu. “Explaining After-Tax Mutual Fund 
Performance.” The Financial Analysts Journal 58, no. 1 (2002): 75-86.
Sharpe, William  . “Capital Asset Prices: A theory of Market Equilibrium under Conditions of Risk.” 
Journal of Finance 19 (1964): 425-42.
Sharpe, William. “The Arithmetic of Active Management.” The Financial Analysts’ Journal Vol. 47, 
(1991): 7-9.
Strong, Robert A.. Practical investment management  . 3. ed. Mason, Ohio: Thomson/South-Western, 
2004.
Wermers, Russ. “Mutual Fund Performance: An Empirical Decomposition into Stock-Picking Talent, 
Style, Transactions Costs, and Expenses.” The Journal of Finance 55, no. 4 (2002): 1655-1695.
